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25X1

1 November 1963

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

1 November 1963

### DAILY BRIEF

\*South Vietnam: (Information as of 0500 EST)  
Coups action initiated this morning in Saigon by senior  
Vietnamese military officers has developed rapidly.

Anti-Diem forces have seized control of various  
key installations and have the palace under seige, where  
fighting is reported. [REDACTED]

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Despite these initial successes by the coup forces,  
the situation is still obscure and various troop move-  
ments are reported under way in the Saigon area. [REDACTED]

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There are no reports of casualties among American  
personnel who have been advised by radio to remain off  
the streets. [REDACTED]

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Pakistan-India: (An exchange of shooting on the Kashmir cease-fire line on 30 October between Indian and Pakistani-sponsored local forces follows generally increased tensions between the two countries.)

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(Additional incidents may follow. Both sides, however, will almost certainly try to keep them localized. Pakistan presumably wants to avoid a generalized conflict in Kashmir in which India would enjoy a military superiority. India, on the other hand, would be reluctant to risk encouraging Chinese initiatives along the Himalayan frontier, and to endanger the flow of military aid from the US and UK. Pakistan has approximately 25,000 men available near the cease-fire line, including regular army and militia units; India has 40,000.)

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DAILY BRIEF

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Afghanistan: King Zahir Shah apparently is starting to reverse former prime minister Daud's policy of relying almost entirely on the Soviet Union for Afghan military training. The Afghan defense minister states that Kabul wants to increase substantially the limited number of Afghans receiving such training in the United States. The King has been concerned that the Soviet training constituted a long-term danger to the loyalty of the armed forces, but seems to wish to expand training in the United States and Western Europe gradually enough not to give undue offense to Moscow.

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Greece: In the campaign for the 3 November national elections former premier Karamanlis' National Radical Union appears to have lost some ground to its major opponent, George Papandreou's Center Union. The Communist-dominated United Democratic Left, the third-ranking party, has also failed to gain momentum and is not likely to increase its parliamentary strength significantly. If Karamanlis does not get a working majority in Parliament, Greece will probably enter a period of political instability requiring another round of elections at an early date.

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DAILY BRIEF

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The Vice President

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- Special Counsel to the President
- The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
- The Scientific Adviser to the President
- The Director of the Budget
- The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

## The Department of State

- The Secretary of State
- The Under Secretary of State
- The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
- The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
- The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
- The Director of Intelligence and Research

## The Treasury Department

- The Secretary of the Treasury
- The Under Secretary of the Treasury

## The Department of Defense

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- The Deputy Secretary of Defense
- The Secretary of the Army
- The Secretary of the Navy
- The Secretary of the Air Force
- The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
- The Assistant Secretary of Defense
- The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
- Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
- Chief of Staff, United States Army
- Commandant, United States Marine Corps
- U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
- Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
- Commander in Chief, Pacific
- Commander in Chief, Atlantic
- The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
- The Director, The Joint Staff
- The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
- The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
- The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
- The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

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